I would say that morality is, in general, objective rather than subjective (moral values may be objectively right or wrong, moral duties objectively obligated or prohibited, and moral rights objectively possessed or unpossessed, independent of whether the acting moral agent, or even everyone in the world, believes that they are). Of course, the moral status of a stated action is a function of contextual factors (an instance of shooting a gun might be morally permissible if a pile of sand is in its range, but morally prohibited is a person is in its range), and some of those contextual factors may include the agent's beliefs and/or deliverances of conscience, so that contingent on the fiddlier details of the definitions, some subset of moral duties might turn out to be subjective, albeit perhaps dependent on other objective moral duties such as "agents are morally prohibited from violating their own conscience." But I would only propose this case as a sufficient condition to establish a moral prohibition, not a necessary one, and many other occurrences will be entirely objective.
As for whether morality is absolute, I take this question to have a much more arbitrary linguistic dependence. Objective VS subjective moral status is the kind of thing one attributes to a particular (real or hypothetical) occurrence of an action, whereas absolute moral status is the kind of thing one attributes to a collection of such occurrences. I take the question of whether killing is absolutely morally wrong to be asking whether all instances of killing are wrong. I would say that they aren't (self-defense and so forth), and that therefore killing is not absolutely morally wrong, but I would also say that most instances of killing are nonetheless objectively morally wrong. Note that there are at least two trivial ways to establish absolute morality; by tautology and by exhaustive specification. Murder
is absolutely wrong, but only because murder is defined as wrongful killing, so we're really just saying that wrongful killing is wrong (wrongful food refrigeration is also wrong; we don't learn much of substance from a tautology). Killing except in context #1, context #2, context #3, ..., context #n is also absolutely wrong, where the n contexts just carve out all of the exceptions by brute force, but this again feels trivial. In general, I don't think morality tends to be best viewed as absolute except in these trivial senses, although I take this to be more a function of the English language and the concepts we group actions according to than moral ontology. The bit where I said morality is objective is more important to moral ontology.
In general, my understanding of morality is pretty firmly in the
deontological camp, but I'm not entirely settled on the agent-centered deontology/patient-centered deontology debate. My current view is that both agent-centered deontological objects (moral obligations, moral prohibition, etc.) and patient-centered deontological objects (moral rights) coexist, and that often one may be derived from the other, but I'm not quite sure on the conditions for that to happen (I don't think all moral obligations and prohibitions correspond to moral rights and I don't think all moral right violations are attributable to moral obligation or prohibition violations, but they do seem interrelated in many cases). The agent-centered objects seem more fundamental to morality (even if someone else had a moral right, why should I respect it unless that moral right entails some moral obligation or prohibition of mine?), while moral rights seem more directly amenable to establishing legal rights (the mere fact that I violate my moral obligation or prohibition does not seem to constitute a just reason for another person or group to stop me, unless in doing so I also violate the rights of another).
Unfortunately I'm also not quite settled on a holistic theory of property rights. It seems at least
some notion of property rights belongs among the class of moral rights, suggesting that governance structures
recognize and
defend rather than
create them, but I don't think this can account for
all notions of property in the modern world. I take the ownership right over a stock index derivative to be created by financial institutions, not recognized or defended as a natural moral right. Stealing a stock index derivative is still objective morally wrong, it's just that the boundaries of what constitutes ownership and stealing by extension emerge or are defined as part of the operations of a system, rather than existing prior to it (as the right to life, right to liberty, certain property rights, etc., presumably have all ingredients they need to exist and apply logically prior to the systems which defend them). I don't find this much more mysterious or problematic to the classification of morality as objective than the idea that the boundaries of what constitutes an objectively morally wrongful shooting depend on whether someone has walked in front of the gun.
To reiterate on the more applied note, stealing in real life is bad, don't do it (even if legal, although legal frameworks may define the boundaries of
some more systemically constructed classes of property), but you can act out stealing in a movie, or play capture the flag or roleplay stealing in a video game where permitted (even if capture the flag or the video game are played for real money). I don't buy the bit about fictional representations of wrongful acts being generically wrongful due to their potential to influence others to act wrongfully. There may be fringe cases in which fictional representations are specifically constructed to manipulate particular persons or groups to commit moral rights violations, but a category like "glorifying crime" will be several orders of magnitude too broad to get me on board with that kind of blanket utilitarian critique of art.
I never cary loot in space though.
