SoberPhil
Old Alpha
- Joined
- Dec 20, 2019
- Posts
- 757
- Location
- Long ago and far away
- Society
- Victory
- Avatar Name
- Philippus SoberPhil Maximus
Yes.Well, if you are using the term "thief" in the same sense in all four instances, then sure, it's just a statement of fact by tautology, but if you intend this quote to have some nontrivial meaning, then perhaps you should make the senses explicit. The most plausible principle I can extrapolate from the statement, "a thief is a thief," would be something like "moral designations are invariant across fictional representation," which seems clearly false.
Surely you would recognize a relevant moral difference between an actor stealing something and a character they play stealing something. Surely you would recognize a relevant moral difference between an author telling a lie and a narrator they create telling a lie. Surely you would recognize a relevant moral difference between kidnapping and capturing a piece in a game of chess (even if there is a mutually agreed wager on the chess game such that the capturing action results in financial loss for the opponent). Even sticking to Entropian examples, I bet you'd recognize a relevant moral difference between shooting someone IRL and fictionally representing your avatar shooting their avatar at the Twin PVP ring.
Thus "a thief is a thief" is not at all obvious. Doing X is generally not morally equivalent to, or even a factor in analyzing, fictionally representing doing X. There would need to be some explanation given for why this particular moral designation transcends this particular fictional representation, as it would be, by far, the exception rather than the rule. The RCE element doesn't seem sufficient as an explanation; even if we modify the chess wager example to attach a dollar value to each individual piece, the line between doing X and fictionally representing doing X remains intact.